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THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS ON THE RETURN
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Govert E. Bijwaard, Christian Schluter, and Jackline Wahba*
Abstract—Using administrative panel data on the entire population of new
labor immigrants to the Netherlands, we estimate the effects of individual
labor market spells on immigration durations using the timing-of-events
method. The model allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity across
migration, unemployment, and employment processes. We find that unem-
ployment spells increase return probabilities for all immigrant groups, while
reemployment spells typically delay returns.
I. Introduction
THE labor market performance of immigrants in the hostcountry has received ample attention in the empirical
literature. Neglected, however, is the question as to what
extent this labor market performance affects the decisions
of migrants to return to their source country. In particular,
what is the effect of adverse or positive labor market events
such as the occurrence of unemployment spells and reem-
ployment spells? How does the effect vary by the duration
of the labor market spell? The failure of the empirical liter-
ature to ask these questions, let alone to furnish convincing
answers, arises from a combination of methodological chal-
lenges and severe limitations of the data usually encountered
in migration analysis.
We address these novel questions using a unique admin-
istrative panel for the entire population of recent immi-
grants to the Netherlands covering the years 1999 to 2007.
These data characteristics—large size, repeated and accu-
rate measurement—are fairly unique in migration analysis
(exceptions are Nekby, 2006, for Sweden and Aydemir and
Robinson, 2008, for Canada) and enable us to examine dura-
tions reliably. The usual data situation is one of small samples,
possibly subject to selectivity and attrition issues, extracted
from surveys of respondents who provide recall data. These
problems are particularly acute in studies of migration dura-
tions since survey attrition usually confounds out-migration.
By contrast, our administrative population data have no
attrition. We expand on three important features of our data.
First, this Dutch immigrant register is based on the legal
requirement for immigrants to register with the authorities
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upon arrival.1 Several other official registers are linked by
Statistics Netherlands to this immigrant register, such as
social benefits and the income register (used by the tax
authorities). Sojourn times in labor market states are thus
accurately recorded. Consequently, no data based on individ-
ual recall have to be used. Moreover, the usual concerns about
measurement error are less acute.
A second important feature of our data is the adminis-
trative report in the immigrant register (consistent with the
visa status at entry) of the reason for immigration. This
enables us to focus explicitly and exclusively on 94,270 labor
immigrants. The reason for the immigration is usually latent
in standard data sets, and different behavioral patterns of
labor and nonlabor migrants would confound the empiri-
cal analysis. Indeed, the other immigrant groups, such as
family migrants, differ systematically from labor migrants
in terms of labor market attachment, return behavior, and
demographic characteristics.
Size is the third attractive feature of our data to be high-
lighted here, as it allows us to stratify our analysis rather than
be constrained to estimate one common model on pooled
data. Such pooling is problematic since immigration laws
stipulate visa requirements that differ by country of origin,
and visa status in turn affects migration and labor market
behaviors. We consider immigrants from sending countries
in the EU15 (“old Europe”) and the new EU (the majority of
whom arrived after the EU enlargement in 2004); the coun-
tries outside Europe are grouped into developed (DCs) and
less developed (LDCs) sending countries.
While modern duration analysis (see van den Berg, 2001,
for a survey) is widely applied in labor economics, the limi-
tations of survey data have prevented its widescale adoption
in migration studies. The richness of our data enables us to
go beyond standard modeling of migration durations and to
tackle the complex task of examining jointly the migration
and labor market processes using a mixed proportional haz-
ards framework. In particular, we estimate the effects of the
labor market dynamics on the return decision of immigrants
using the “timing-of-events” method (Abbring & van den
Berg, 2003). At the same time, we control for the correlated
effects that arise from the correlation between unobservables
in the migration and labor market process (ignoring these, we
show, would result in substantial endogeneity biases). Our
model for the migration duration permits the sojourn times
in the various labor market states to have effects that depend
on both duration and the timing of the labor market spells.
1 They are also required to deregister when leaving. Noncompliers are
removed from the register by administrators. We know that these individuals
have out-migrated, but the exact date of their departure is unknown. We take
this administrative removal into account in our modeling.
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These concerns distinguish this paper from the recent
empirical literature on return migration. For instance, out-
migration propensities of both immigrants and natives have
been considered in Nekby (2006) for Sweden. Using admin-
istrative data, she estimates linear probability models and
focuses on the role of characteristics, finding evidence of
positive selection in terms of education. Rather than using
a static framework, Aydemir and Robinson (2008) estimate
standard proportional hazard models on administrative data
for Canada, reporting evidence of positive selection in terms
of skill levels. Instead of focusing exclusively on characteris-
tics, Kirdar (2009) also considers the effect of unemployment
spells on the return decision using survey data for Ger-
many. Estimating logistic hazard specifications, he finds that
the effect of unemployment spells on out-migration haz-
ards depends on unemployment durations. Bijwaard (2010)
estimates mover-stayer proportional hazards models using
administrative data for different migration motives for the
Netherlands, reporting high return rates for labor migrants.
However, he does not consider labor market dynamics, as we
do here. These approaches to migration duration estimation
differ from ours. Unlike these three studies, we also control
for unobserved heterogeneity (see van den Berg, 2001, for
a discussion of the importance of this). A complementary,
mainly theoretical literature focuses on the reason for return
migration. However, by not considering the effects of labor
market shocks, the concerns of this literature are different
from ours.2
We find that, unconditionally, both unemployment and
return migration are substantial: between 35% and 50%
of labor immigrants experience unemployment, and 48%
leave the host country during the observation window of
1999 to 2007. Turning to the effects of the labor market
experiences, we found that unemployment periods increase
return probabilities for all immigrant groups, while reem-
ployment typically delays returns. All effects are substantial
and significant.
The impact estimates are valid under the assumption that
unemployment affects the migration hazard only after its
start, not before. We discuss several threats to identifica-
tion posed by the potential anticipation of the unemployment
event by out-migration (noting that anticipators, by terminat-
ing their employment, forgo income and the option value of
on-the-job search). Further threats in the Dutch case arise at
precise migration durations that trigger statutory changes in
employment and residence rights of the individual. The scope
for systematic anticipation is, however, limited by the flexibil-
ity of the Dutch labor market, the little power that unions have,
and the short statutory notice period. Finally, we verify the
robustness of our results to several of our population selection
2 The two principal opposing paradigms are theories of optimal migration
durations based on preference for source country consumption (Galor &
Stark, 1991; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007) or target savings (Dustmann, 2003),
and theories of mistaken expectations and immediate failure on the labor
market (Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996). Empirical tests are conducted in Yang
(2006) and Gibson and McKenzie (2011).
choices in several data- and simulation-based sensitivity
checks.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The data are
described in section II. The econometric model is set out
in detail in section III. We specify the labor market and
the migration processes and elucidate the role of unobserv-
able heterogeneity. The identification argument is discussed
in section IIIC. Estimation proceeds by maximizing the
likelihood, presented in section IIIE. The empirical results
follow in section IV, and in section IVE, we present several
robustness checks. Section V concludes.
II. Administrative Panel Data on the Population of
Recent Immigrants to the Netherlands
All legal immigration by non-Dutch citizens to the Nether-
lands is registered in the Central Register Foreigners (Cen-
traal Register Vreemdelingen, CRV), using information from
the Immigration Police (Vreemdelingen Politie) and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Immigratie en Nat-
uralisatie Dienst, IND). It is mandatory for every immigrant to
notify the local population register immediately after arrival
in the Netherlands if he or she intends to stay for at least
two-thirds of the following six months. Natives as well as
immigrants are required to register with their municipality.
Our data comprise the entire population of immigrants who
entered during our observation window of 1999 to 2007.
In addition to the date of entry and exit, the administration
records the individual’s reason from migration. The motive
is usually coded according to the visa status of the immigrant
(see the web appendix for some details); if not, the immi-
grant reports the reason when registering in the population
register. Statistics Netherlands distinguishes several reasons:
labor migrants, family migrants, student immigrants, asylum
seekers (and refugees), and immigrants for other reasons.
Given the focus of this paper on labor market events, we con-
sider exclusively labor migrants, which represent 26% of all
non-Dutch immigrants in the age group 18 to 64.3
It is possible that the reason for labor migration is either
miscoded or misreported. Since most non-EU labor migrants
require an employment-dependent work visa to immigrate,
they should be formally employed shortly after entry. Thus,
in order to limit the possibilities of misclassification error of
the reason for labor migration, we require that immigrants
be employed in the Netherlands within three months of their
entry (we have verified that our results are not sensitive to this
particular cut-off; see section IVE). Of the original 146,290
migrants with a labor motive, 94,270 (64%) are employed
within three months of their entry.
This immigration register is linked by Statistics Nether-
lands to the Municipal Register of Population (Gemeentelijke
3 This restriction is justified in detail in the discussion paper version of
this paper (Bijwaard, Schluter, & Wahba, 2012), where we show that the
other migrant groups have a substantially larger propensity to remain in the
Netherlands, have a significantly weaker attachment to the labor market,
and are demographically different.
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Basisadministratie, GBA) and their Social Statistical Data-
base (SSD). The GBA contains basic demographic character-
istics of the migrants, such as age, gender, marital status, and
country of origin. From the SSD we have information (on a
monthly basis) on the labor market position, income, industry
sector, housing, and household situation. Since we consider
only new entrants to the Netherlands, most immigrants are
not eligible for social benefits such as unemployment insur-
ance payments; these are conditional on sufficiently long
employment or length of residence (for non-EU immigrants,
essentially five years). Statistics Netherlands classifies an
individual as employed if the principal source of income is
employment and as unemployed otherwise.
Although in principle the exact date of emigration is
known, some migrants do not officially inform the author-
ities when they leave. The departure of these noncomplying
individuals is registered as an administrative removal after the
authorities have assessed that the migrant has left the munici-
pality without showing up in the files of another municipality
in the Netherlands or as an emigrant. Given the municipal-
ity registration requirement for all citizens, we know that
these migrants have left the Netherlands for certain; however,
the exact date of their departure is unknown. These admin-
istrative removals are included among emigration, and they
amount to around 38% of all emigrations. Of these admin-
istratively removed migrants, 73% have no observed income
in the country. We conjecture that the majority of these
migrants left the country shortly after they stopped receiving
income (either earnings or benefits). For those who still have
income until they are administratively removed, we assume
that they left at that exact date. We have explicitly addressed
the issue of administrative removals in the formulation of the
likelihoods below.
We thus arrive at a data set that contains 94,270 labor
immigrants, 120,287 employment spells, and 56,783 peri-
ods of unemployment. Distinguishing migrants according to
their initial labor mobility, we estimate separate models for
migrants from sending countries in the EU15 (“old Europe”),
the new EU (the majority of whom are Poles and arrived after
2004), and the countries outside Europe, which are grouped
into developed (DCs) and less developed (LDCs) sending
countries. These groupings are defined precisely in the online
appendix.
A. Summary Statistics: Labor Immigrants
We discuss the summary statistics for our data relating
to the dynamics of migration and of labor market events (the
online appendix considers other aspects of the data). In table 1
we consider the incidence of return migration and conditional
on returning, the duration of the stay in the Netherlands. Note
that the group of “stayers” includes permanent immigrants
and temporary migrants who have not yet returned. Hence
immigrants from the new EU, having arrived predominantly
in the second half of our observation window, are expected
to exhibit a high proportion of incomplete migration periods.
Table 1.—Descriptive Dynamics
Non-EU
EU15 New EU DCs LDCs
Stayera 48.2% 70.9% 40.9% 58.6%
Length of stay at return migration
Less than 6 months 3.9% 12.9% 2.4% 6.0%
6–12 months 11.3% 20.0% 10.3% 13.6%
12–18 months 13.3% 17.1% 12.4% 13.2%
18–24 months 13.1% 14.0% 15.2% 13.4%
24–60 months 46.4% 29.7% 49.1% 43.6%
More than 5 years 11.6% 6.4% 10.8% 10.2%
Average in months 32.5 23.9 32.8 30.6
Labor market dynamics
Mean number of periods of employment and unemployment per migrant
Employment 1.349 1.233 1.093 1.221
Unemployment 0.714 0.475 0.405 0.509
Always employedb 49.9% 63.8% 64.5% 62.6%
Unemployed once 36.9% 28.5% 32.0% 29.1%
Unemployed more than once 13.2% 7.8% 3.5% 8.3%
Never reemployedc 77.9% 83.4% 92.9% 86.2%
Reemployed once 14.5% 12.2% 5.8% 9.1%
Reemployed more than once 7.5% 4.4% 1.3% 4.8%
aStayers are migrants who remain in the country to the end of the observation period.
bPercentage of migrants employed through their entire stay in the country.
cPercentage of migrants never reemployed, unemployed, and then reemployed during their stay in the
country.
This is borne out in the data, since the share of stayers from
the new EU is 71%, whereas for other immigrants the range
is between 41% and 59%. Relatedly, the durations of their
completed periods of employment are shorter. However, a
large share of new EU movers (13%) leave the Netherlands
after less than six months, which is considerably larger than
for other immigrant groups. These differences highlight the
importance of an analysis disaggregating by sending coun-
tries. Immigrants from the EU15 are more (less) likely to
stay than migrants from (less) developed countries outside
the EU. Conditional on returning, the distribution of com-
pleted durations looks fairly similar for these three groups,
as do the average durations.
Turning to the return probabilities by migration duration,
figure 1 depicts their Kaplan Meier estimates for all immi-
grant groups.4 All groups look very similar for durations up
to 24 months, after which the estimates fan out. Considering
the two extreme estimates, immigrants from non-EU DCs
are more likely to return than new EU immigrants, and this
gap increases significantly until the end of the observation
window. The other immigrant groups assume an intermedi-
ate position. Overall, both table 1 and figure 1 highlight the
temporary nature of labor migration. Across all immigrant
groups, a substantial proportion leave the Netherlands within
our observation window of 1999 to 2007, and many do so
within 24 months.5
4 See Wooldridge (2010). The estimator is Pr{Tm ≤ ar} = 1−∏ri=1(Ni −
Ei)/Ni with r = 1, · · · , R where Tm denotes the migration duration, Ei the
number of immigrants observed to leave in the ith interval [ai−1, ai), and Ni
is size of the risk set for this interval (the number of immigrants who have
neither left nor have been censored at time ai−1).
5 As a comparison, Aydemir and Robinson (2008) find that the out-
migration rate in Canada twenty years after arrival is around 35% among
young, working-age, male immigrants, and around six of ten of those who
leave do so within the first year of arrival.
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Figure 1.—Kaplan Meier Estimates of Return Probabilities
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Table 2.—Descriptive Statistics: Unemployed Immigrants Who Leave
Non-EU
EU15 New EU DCs LDCs
Unemployed at emigrationa 54.3% 44.4% 40.8% 48.7%
Repeated unemploymentb 20.4% 14.1% 7.9% 15.1%
Mean number & period of unemploymentb 1.30 1.20 1.10 1.22
Current unemployment durationb
Less than 3 months 18.5% 26.4% 23.3% 20.1%
3–6 months 15.8% 22.5% 17.1% 17.1%
6–12 months 22.7% 22.6% 19.5% 22.4%
More than 1 year 43.0% 28.5% 40.1% 40.4%
Average number of months 15.1 10.8 14.6 13.8
Preceding employment durationb
Less than 3 months 16.4% 17.7% 6.2% 11.8%
3–6 months 15.1% 17.7% 10.8% 11.9%
6–12 months 45.7% 39.0% 60.4% 54.0%
More than 1 year 22.8% 25.6% 22.6% 22.3%
Average number of months 15.5 13.2 20.0 17.8
aAs percentage of all migrants who leave.
bAt the departure moment for the migrants who are unemployed when they leave.
Turning to the labor market dynamics, table 1 reveals that
migrants from the EU15, relative to the other groups, expe-
rience greater labor market volatility. During the observation
window, they experience a higher incidence of unemploy-
ment (the mean number of periods of unemployment is 0.7),
and more employment periods (1.3). A slightly bigger pro-
portion are more than unemployed once (13%), and the share
of the “always employed” is smaller (50%).6
Since we seek to estimate the effects of negative and
positive individual labor market shocks on the migration
durations, we now consider the immigrants by their labor
market status prior to their departure from the host country.
Tables 2 and 3 condition on leaving the host country, whereas
table 1 considered the unconditional labor market dynamics.
6 Note that migrants who are always employed enter the likelihood as
censored observations.
Table 3.—Descriptive Statistics: Reemployed Immigrants Who Leave
Non-EU
EU15 New EU DCs LDCs
Reemployed at emigrationa 7.4% 9.9% 2.7% 4.8%
Repeated reemploymentb 29.9% 29.3% 10.2% 33.8%
Mean number of periods of reemploymentb 1.45 1.42 1.13 1.52
Current (re-)employment durationb
Less than 3 months 18.2% 26.9% 17.1% 17.0%
3–6 months 16.7% 21.6% 15.1% 17.4%
6–12 months 23.4% 22.5% 26.9% 23.7%
More than 1 year 41.7% 29.0% 40.9% 41.9%
Average number of months 15.0 10.7 13.9 14.4
Preceding unemployment durationb
Less than 1 month 18.3% 22.2% 11.3% 20.7%
1–2 months 18.1% 18.1% 18.3% 13.2%
2–3 months 17.2% 20.0% 16.7% 20.4%
3–6 months 20.5% 19.7% 17.4% 22.0%
6–12 months 17.4% 13.2% 26.3% 15.9%
More than 1 year 8.5% 6.8% 8.6% 7.8%
Average number of months 5.1 4.3 6.3 4.9
aAs percentage of all migrants who leave.
bAt the departure moment for the migrants who are reemployed when they leave.
In table 2 we condition on being unemployed at the time
of the return migration. In line with the results of table
1, immigrants from the EU15 have a higher incidence of
unemployment at the time of their departure (54%), a higher
incidence of repeated unemployment (20%), and they are
more likely on average to experience longer periods of unem-
ployment (15 months). Immigrants from non-EU DCs have,
compared to Europeans, a lower incidence of unemployment
(41%) and of repeated unemployment (8%), while their pre-
ceding periods of employment were longer on average (20
months).
In table 3 we consider immigrants who, after a period of
unemployment, found a job and subsequently left. Hence this
group has a volatile labor market experience (employment,
followed by unemployment, followed by reemployment), but
the last labor market experience is a positive one. Unsur-
prisingly, the incidence of such labor market histories is
low, ranging between 3% and 10%. Although non-European
immigrants from DCs exhibit the lowest incidence (3%), the
durations of the last two labor market spells look fairly simi-
lar across all groups, except for the new EU immigrants, who
experience typically shorter durations.
III. The Econometric Model
We seek to determine the effect of labor market dynam-
ics on the return migration intensity of immigrants, so the
random outcome variable of interest is the time spent in
the Netherlands, denoted by Tm. The observational units
are labor immigrants in the host country (the Netherlands).
For expositional clarity, we first present a restricted model
of the migration period that ignores the labor market pro-
cesses. These are introduced subsequently, and we address
the empirical challenge that arises from the potential corre-
lation between the labor market process and the migration
process, which confounds the direct effect of interest.
LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS ON THE RETURN MIGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS 487
Figure 2.—Migration and Labor Market Dynamics
We follow common practice in duration analysis and
express the distribution of the migration duration variate Tm
in terms of the associated hazard, say, θm. The proportional
hazard (PH) model expresses this return hazard as the product
between a baseline hazard, λm(t), which is a function of time
alone and common to all individuals, and a covariate func-
tion, exp(xm(t)βmx ), which accelerates exits: θm(t|xm(t)) =
λm(t) exp(xm(t)βmx ). The covariate vector xm(t) is allowed
to change over time. To accommodate unobserved het-
erogeneity, the mixed proportional hazard model (MPH)
extends the PH model by multiplying it by a time-invariant
person-specific error term, say vm, with distribution G:
θm(t|xm(t), vm) = vmλm(t) exp(xm(t)βmx ).
We extend this simple framework in two ways. First, we
introduce the MPH models for the unemployment and reem-
ployment processes and describe the timing of events. All
three processes are allowed to exhibit correlated effects that
can arise from the correlation between the unobserved het-
erogeneity terms (stemming from, for example, dynamic
sorting). We then focus on the direct effect of interest, and
consider and discuss the identification argument.
A. Labor Market Processes and the Timing of Events
Generically, let T denote the random time since first entry
into the Netherlands that an event takes place. In particu-
lar, Tm is the time the immigrant leaves the host country in
order to return to the sending country, Te the time a period
of employment ends in the host country, and Tu the time
an unemployment period ends. The durations of the periods
of employment and unemployment are denoted by δe(t) and
δu(t), respectively.
The timing of events and our definitions are illustrated in
figure 2. We depict the labor market and migration durations
of two migrants. In accordance with our data definitions of
section II, migrants are employed at the moment they enter
the country. Migrant 1 arrives after migrant 2. The length of
migrant 1’s (first) period of employment is δ(te11) = te11.
He remains in the country unemployed until time tm1. His
duration of unemployment is thus δ
(
tu11
)= tu11 − te11. The
unemployment is terminated at the moment he leaves the host
country at time tm1. Migrant 2 stays longer in the country,
tm2 > tm1, and undergoes a different labor market experi-
ence. His first employment has duration δ
(
te21
) = te21. After
an unemployment period of length δ
(
tu21
) = tu21 − te21, he
becomes employed again. This second employment period
is terminated when he leaves the host country at time tm2
and has duration δ
(
te22
)= te22 − tu21. The last labor market
period for each migrant is always censored. While Migrant 1
experiences an adverse labor market shock (unemployment),
migrant 2 experiences a positive shock (reemployment). We
seek to determine the effect of such shocks in terms of both
their incidences and their durations, on the duration of the
migration spell.
Because the migrant is either employed or unemployed,
the labor market process is alternating and has three possible
transitions: unemployment to employment, employment to
unemployment, or return migration. The conditional hazards
for periods of unemployment and reemployment follow MPH
models:
θu
(
δu(t)
∣∣xu(t), vu) = vuλu(δu(t)) exp
(
xu(t)β
u
x
)
, (1)
θe
(
δe(t)
∣∣xe(t), ve) = veλe(δe(t)) exp
(
xe(t)β
e
x
)
, (2)
with baseline hazards λk , unobserved time-invariant char-
acteristics vk , and observed time-varying characteristics xk ,
where k ∈ {u, e} denotes the labor market state. In order to
keep track of labor market events, we also define the associ-
ated time-varying indicators: the indicator Iu(t) takes a value
of 1 if the migrant is unemployed at time t, and Ir(t) indi-
cates that the immigrant is employed again after a period
of unemployment. This setting is further generalized by
distinguishing between the number of the labor market spell.
The return migration hazard is also of the MPH form. We
allow Tm, δe(t), and δu(t) to be correlated through unobserv-
able heterogeneity terms and through a possible direct effect
of labor market dynamics on the migration hazard. The latter
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is the effect to which we now turn. We consider both the inci-
dence of the unemployment and reemployment event, as well
as its duration, and allow the impact to vary systematically
with observed characteristics. In our empirical implementa-
tion, these three aspects of the impacts (incidence, duration,
and heterogeneity) are considered progressively. Thus, the
extended MPH model for the return hazard is
θm(t|tu, te, xm(t), z(t), vm) = vmλm(t)
× exp
(
xm(t)β
m
x + Iu(t)
{
γu + αu
(
δu(t)
)+ zu(t)φu
}
+ Ir(t)
{
γe + αe
(
δe(t)
)+ ze(t)φe
})
. (3)
The covariates z in the (return) migration hazard are a subset
of the time-varying characteristics of the migrants x. The
duration impacts, αk , are modeled by piecewise constant
functions, so these effects are allowed to exhibit duration
dependence. The unobserved error terms (ve, vu, vm) are dis-
tributed according to some distribution function G and induce
correlated effects, to which we now turn.
B. Endogeneity: Confounding Unobservable Heterogeneity
It is well known that due to dynamic sorting effects, the
distribution of ve among those who become unemployed at
te will differ from its population distribution. In particular,
individuals with high ve will tend to enter unemployment
earlier than individuals with low ve. If ve and vm are depen-
dent, the distribution vm for unemployed migrants at a given
time in the country will differ from the distribution of vm
for migrants still employed. Similarly, if vm and vu are not
independent, then the distribution of vm among reemployed
migrants will differ from its population distribution. There-
fore, one cannot infer the causal effect of unemployment on
the return migration from a comparison of the realized dura-
tions of those who became unemployed at te with the rest of
the population, because one would then mix the causal effect
of unemployment on the duration with the difference in the
distribution of vm between these migrants. In this case, Iu(t)
and Ir(t) will be endogenous, and Tu, Te, and Tm should be
modeled jointly to account for the dependence of the unob-
served heterogeneity terms. Therefore, we allow vu, ve, and
vm to be correlated.
For parsimony,7 we assume that each of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms remains the same for recurrent dura-
tions of the same type, and we adopt a two-factor loading
model with two independent fundamental factors, W1 and
W2, both having a discrete distribution on (−1, 1) with
7 After five years of continuous full-time employment, immigrants in the
Netherlands can apply for permanent residenceship, making them eligi-
ble for welfare and employment rights similar to those enjoyed by natives
(by contrast, EU15 immigrants gain these almost immediately; see online
appendix A for details). Such a status change could imply that the unob-
served heterogeneity vector v changes at this date. However, our Kaplan
Meier estimates of figure 1 reveal that most immigrants return before month
60, and that at this date, the return probability does not exhibit a jump.
pj = Pr(Wj = 1). Hence,
vk = exp(αk1W1 + αk2W2), (4)
with k = {u, e, m}. Let W = (W1, W2)′, v = (ve, vu, vm)′, and
A be the matrix of factor loadings with rows Ak = (αk1, αk2).
Note that this two-factor model is very general as it allows
for positive and negative correlations among the unobserved
heterogeneity terms. The variance-covariance matrix of the
unobserved heterogeneity terms is given by Var
(
ln(v)
) =
AVar(W)A′.8 Using a two-point mass specification to model
unobserved heterogeneity is common in duration analysis,
and extending this to correlated processes by considering a
factor-loading specification has also been pursued recently in
Crépon, Ferracci, and Fougére (2012) and Osikominu (2013).
C. Identification and the Timing-of-Events Method
The full effect of employment dynamics on remigra-
tion hazards is given in our framework by the functions
γu + αu
(
δu(t)
) + zu(t)φu and γe + αe(δe(t)) + ze(t)φe. An
application of the timing-of-events method of Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003) implies that these effects can have a
causal interpretation. This method requires that the dura-
tions of employment, unemployment, and migration are
modeled parametrically as MPHs, as we have, and that the
so-called no-anticipation assumption holds. Denote by te the
time an unemployment event would start, and consider first
the migration hazard at a time t before the unemployment
event. The (untestable) no-anticipation assumption requires
that migrants do not anticipate the unemployment event by
migrating before the anticipated event would occur. The
migration intensity θm
(
t|te, tu, xm(t), vm
)
is assumed to be
affected only for t > te:
θm
(
t|te1 , .
) = θm(t|te2 , .) for all t < min{te1 , te2}. (5)
We proceed to discuss some potential threats to the validity
of the no-anticipation assumption with particular reference to
the Dutch case (see the online appendix A for a more detailed
discussion of Dutch labor and residentship law). The latent
risk group consists of currently employed immigrants who
expect to lose their jobs at some future time te > t, and
“anticipators” are those among them who migrate at time
t < te. By choosing to migrate, they forgo two payoffs: (a)
they terminate their employment voluntarily and thus forgo
the expected income flow until time te and any redundancy
compensation if eligible, and (b) they forgo the option of on-
the-job search for a new job before te and the option of job
search from unemployment after te. However, these option
values are usually nontrivial. In particular, immigrants who
become unemployed are permitted to search for a new job
subject to time limits, and table 1 has shown that reemploy-
ment probabilities are significant. As for on-the-job search,
8 One additional restriction is needed for identification. We let αm2 = 0.
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external estimates for Dutch data suggest that job-to-job tran-
sitions exceed job offer arrival rates for the unemployed (van
den Berg & Ridder, 1998, table VII)). The scope for anticipa-
tion is also limited by the flexibility of the Dutch labor market:
unions have little power, and the statutory notice period for
a job termination, one month, is short; hence, the potential
anticipation period te − tm is likely to be short relative to
the migration duration tm (recall from figure 1 that only a
small proportion of immigrants leave within one year and
only about 20% have left within two years). In order to gauge
the magnitude of the potential bias induced by anticipation,
online appendix B considers extensive simulation evidence.
We consider two other potential threats to identification
peculiar to the Dutch legal framework: (a) in month 36 of
continuous full-time employment any full-time work con-
tract9 essentially becomes permanent, and (b) in month 60 of
continuous full-time employment, non-EU immigrants gain
residence and benefit rights. Some employers might thus have
an incentive to terminate a contract at these critical dates. To
assess the empirical relevance of these threats, we recon-
sider the Kaplan Meier estimates of the return probabilities
of figure 1. An active systematic threat should manifest itself
in terms of jumps. The figure, however, does not suggest the
presence of jumps around months 36 and 60.
D. Administrative Removal
Some migrants do not officially inform the authorities that
they are about to leave the host country. However, all citi-
zens (immigrants and natives) are required to register with
their municipalities (this is a prerequisite for many social
services and for tax benefit matters). It is thus clear that any
migrant who has no entries in the tax benefit register and
does not appear in the register of another municipality must
have left the country. Only the exact date of the departure is
unknown. Such noncompliers are periodically identified and
removed from the registers by the authorities in a step labeled
“administrative removal.”
We address this as follows. We assume that the two observ-
able events of administrative removal and zero income at
last observed time imply that the migrant has left before the
date the administrative removal is recorded, and after the last
date of any observed change in the observed characteristics
(e.g., labor market status, housing, and marital status). Such
limited information is equivalent to interval-censored data.
For interval-censored data, the exact end of a duration is
unknown, but it is known that the duration ended at some
point. If a migrant is administratively removed at duration
ta and the last observed change for this migrant occurred at
duration t1 < ta, the contribution to the likelihood (of the out-
migration) of this migrant is the probability of survival until t1
times the probability that the migrant left the country between
t1 and ta. The latter is equal to the survival from t1 until ta
9 Unfortunately, we do not have data about the status of an individual’s
work contract; however, external estimates (Sà, 2008) suggest that the share
of temporary contracts among recent male immigrants is about 32%.
given survival. Consequently, administrative removal has no
effect on the employed part of the likelihood function or on
the likelihood of migrants who are administratively removed
with nonzero income until their administrative removal date.
Let ai indicate whether the emigration of migrant i was due
to an administrative removal (ai = 1). For an administratively
removed migrant, we introduce two different event dates: tai
is the administrative removal date, and t1i < tai is the date
of the last recorded change in any of the characteristics of
migrant i before tai .
E. Likelihood Function
We have data for i = 1, . . . , n immigrants entering the
Netherlands in our observation window. Let Kie and Kiu
denote the number of the observed employment and unem-
ployment spells of individual i. Note that for some migrants,
Kiu = 0 (e.g., a migrant who remains employed). We con-
sider only the first period of migration. The three indicators
Δuik ,Δ
e
ik , andΔmi signal that kth employment/unemployment,
or the migration spell is uncensored. Thus, the likelihood
contribution of migrant i conditional on the unobserved het-
erogeneity v = (ve, vu, vm) is, in the light of the preceding
discussions:
Li(v) =
Kiu∏
k=1
{[
θu
(
δu(tik)
∣∣·, vu)Δuik
× exp
(
−
∫ δu(tik)
0
θu(τ|·, vu)dτ
)](1−aik)
·
[
exp
(
−
∫ δu(t1ik)
0
θu(τ|·, vu)dτ
)
− exp
(
−
∫ δu(taik)
0
θu(τ|·, vu)dτ
)]aik}Iu(t−ik )
×
Kie∏
j=1
[
θe
(
δe(tij)
∣∣·, ve)Δeij exp
(
−
∫ δe(tij)
0
θe(τ|·, ve)dτ
)]Ie(t−ij )
×
[
θm(ti|·, vm)Δmi exp
(
−
∫ ti
0
θm(τ|·, vm)dτ
)](1−ai)
·
[
exp
(
−
∫ t1i
0
θm(τ|·, vm)dτ
)
− exp
(
−
∫ tai
0
θm(τ|·, vm)dτ
)]ai
. (6)
This likelihood naturally separates unemployment, employ-
ment, and migration periods, and for each allows for cen-
soring and administrative removal. To simplify notation, we
have suppressed the dependence on observed characteristics
in the hazard rates. Iu(t−ik ) indicates that the migrant is unem-
ployed just before tik , and similarly for Ie(t−il ). When Kiu = 0,
the relevant term becomes 1. Note that the last, and only the
last, labor market spell is censored. This is either because the
migrant is still in the country at the end of the observation
period or has left.
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Integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity, we obtain
the likelihood function
L =
n∏
i=1
∫ ∫ ∫
Li(v)dG(ve, vu, vm), (7)
where G(ve, vu, vm) is the joint distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms implied by the discussion of vk given by
equation (4).
IV. Results
The full model, given by the MPH hazards (1) to (3)
and the heterogeneity model (4), permits the effects of
the labor market processes to exhibit duration dependence
and vary systematically with observed characteristics, while
controlling for correlated effects that arise from correlated
unobserved heterogeneity. In view of this complexity, and
given the nested structure of the model, we first consider
simpler variants before turning to the full model.
A. The Restricted Model
In order to gain a first descriptive impression of the effect of
the incidence of unemployment on migrants’ return, we com-
pare the Kaplan Meier estimates for the group of immigrants
who always work and those who have experienced unemploy-
ment once (at the date of their return, the latter might be either
still unemployed or are reemployed). For short durations, this
comparison is, of course, distorted, as immigrants who expe-
rience changes in their labor market status must have stayed
for a sufficiently long period to allow such events to take
place.
Figure 3 depicts the Kaplan Meier estimates for all immi-
grants (the plots for each immigrant group look similar). It is
evident that for durations above 20 months, unemployment
seems to have a significant effect on return probabilities. The
size of the effect seems to increase in the duration of stay. We
proceed from this descriptive analysis to the analysis based
on our empirical model.
We focus first on the incidence of labor market events
by setting the varying duration and heterogeneity impacts
to 0, αk = φk = 0, and refer to this as the timing-of-events
model 1. It nests the PH model that ignores unobservable het-
erogeneity altogether, θPHm (t|tu, te, xm(t)) = exp(xm(t)βmx +
Iu(t)γu + Ir(t)γe), whereas the MPH model, θMPHm (t|tu, te,
xm(t), vm) = vmθPHm (t|tu, te, xm(t)) ignores the correlation
between λm and (λu,λe). The coefficients of interest are γu
and γe.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the effects given by γu
and γe. The simple PH model already demonstrates the
importance of labor market events on return migration. In
all cases (except one), the incidence of an unemployment
spell significantly increases return probabilities, and the
event of finding employment increases migration durations.
Extending this model to incorporate (uncorrelated) unob-
served heterogeneity has only a small effect on the estimated
causal effect.
Figure 3.—Kaplan Meier Estimates of Return Probabilities by Labor
Market Experience
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Table 4.—Incidence Impact of Labor Market Events on
Return-Migration Hazards
Non-EU
EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs
Unemployment
PH model 1.045∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.103 1.400∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.192) (0.219) (0.300)
MPH model 1.144∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.267 1.501∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.193) (0.239) (0.307)
Timing-of-events 0.778∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.223 1.207∗∗∗
model 1 (0.105) (0.197) (0.237) (0.314)
Reemployment
PH model −0.179∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.062) (0.078) (0.061)
MPH model −0.163∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.367∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.063) (0.088) (0.064)
Timing-of-events −0.091∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.093
model 1 (0.038) (0.069) (0.125) (0.083)
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
However, taking into account the correlated unobserved
heterogeneity in the timing-of-events model substantially
affects the estimates. The estimated effect is typically smaller
in magnitude than for both PH and MPH models. For instance,
as regards the incidence of unemployment for EU15 immi-
grants, the MPH estimate is 1.144, whereas our model
estimate is .778, the two differing by a factor of 1.47. We
conclude that ignoring the endogeneity issue would result in
substantial selectivity biases.
B. The Full Model
Building on the insights of the timing-of-events model 1,
we first allow the durations of the labor market events to
have an impact on immigration durations more flexibly. This
is implemented nonparametrically by modeling the sequence
{αk} as piece-wise constant functions. Thus, in model 2, we
have γu = γe = 0 and φu = φe = 0. In model 3, we further
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Table 5.—Estimated Effect of Becoming Unemployed on Return Migration Hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs
Constant effect [γu] 0.778∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.223 1.207∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.197) (0.237) (0.314)
Duration dependence [αu]
0–3 months 0.643∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.379 1.261∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 1.814∗∗∗ 0.108 1.058∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.202) (0.222) (0.308) (0.117) (0.272) (0.241) (0.326)
3–6 months 0.658∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.282 1.406∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 2.054∗∗∗ 0.047 1.183∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.206) (0.224) (0.311) (0.119) (0.275) (0.243) (0.328)
6–12 months 0.517∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ −0.214 1.358∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 1.752∗∗∗ −0.423 1.116∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.211) (0.226) (0.314) (0.119) (0.277) (0.244) (0.328)
More than 1 year 0.312∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.226) (0.224) (0.328) (0.123) (0.278) (0.243) (0.336)
Labor market history [φu]
Repeated unemployment −0.198∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗ 0.067 −0.459∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.205) (0.232) (0.145)
Order of unemployment spell −0.186∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.216 −0.156
(0.032) (0.126) (0.182) (0.083)
Duration of previous employment spell
Less than 3 months −0.302∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗ 0.065 −0.016
(0.043) (0.117) (0.122) (0.103)
3–6 months −0.338∗∗∗ −0.081 0.116 −0.119
(0.043) (0.103) (0.087) (0.096)
More than 1 year −0.318∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗ 0.032 −0.153∗∗
(0.036) (0.092) (0.064) (0.072)
The model equations are given by (1) to (3), the likelihood by (7). SE in parentheses. ∗∗: p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗: p < 0.01. Model 3 covariates (z) also include demographics (sex, married, number of children, age group
dummies, and cohort effects measured by the year of entry). Reference category for employment durations: 6–12 months. “Order of unemployment spell” refers to the second, third, etc. period of unemployment.
Table 6.—Estimated Effect of Reemployment on Return Migration Hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs
Constant effect [γe] −0.091∗∗ 0.277∗∗ −0.356∗∗ −0.093
(0.038) (0.069) (0.125) (0.083)
Duration dependence [αe]
0–3 months −0.222∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗−0.233 −0.327∗∗ −0.096 0.339 −0.164 −0.302
(0.089) (0.113) (0.182) (0.147) (0.082) (0.205) (0.253) (0.186)
3–6 months 0.017 0.454∗∗∗−0.190 0.000 0.127 0.532∗∗ 0.132 0.085
(0.088) (0.122) (0.192) (0.142) (0.083) (0.209) (0.260) (0.185)
6–12 months −0.042 0.203 −0.097 −0.102 0.083 0.319 0.054 0.038
(0.080) (0.119) (0.145) (0.123) (0.077) (0.211) (0.229) (0.172)
More than 1 year −0.315∗∗∗ 0.194 −0.641∗∗∗−0.390∗∗∗−0.242∗∗∗ 0.357 −0.626∗∗∗ 0.140
(0.058) (0.108) (0.119) (0.095) (0.072) (0.210) (0.214) (0.158)
Labor market history [φe]
Repeated reemployment 0.068 0.327 −0.073 0.261
(0.091) (0.214) (0.586) (0.202)
Order of reemployment spell (>1) −0.194∗∗∗−0.055 −0.318 −0.097
(0.051) (0.125) (0.423) (0.107)
On benefit −0.431∗∗∗−0.825∗∗∗ 0.048 −0.570∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.314) (0.284) (0.210)
Duration of previous unemployment spell
Less than 1 month −0.406∗∗∗−0.332∗∗ −0.128 −0.281
(0.080) (0.165) (0.285) (0.174)
1–2 months −0.284∗∗∗−0.138 0.298 −0.580∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.173) (0.248) (0.195)
2–3 months −0.185∗∗ 0.100 −0.037 −0.164
(0.080) (0.168) (0.252) (0.172)
6–12 months 0.030 −0.179 0.294 −0.279
(0.080) (0.188) (0.226) (0.184)
More than 1 year 0.079 −0.162 −0.444 −0.218
(0.101) (0.238) (0.305) (0.240)
See table 5 notes.
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Figure 4.—Assessing the Impact of Truncating Immigration Durations at Month 36
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Left: Kaplan Meier estimates of employment probabilities. Right: Impacts on return probabilities for unemployment periods of 12 months that start in month 3 (broken lines are based on the truncated data at month
36; the solid lines are based on the unrestricted data).
allow the effect to be heterogeneous across migrants in terms
of zu and ze, which measure demographics and previous labor
market history. For expositional clarity, we present the effect
of the periods of unemployment and reemployment spells in
tables 5 and 6 separately, although it is clear from equation (7)
that these are estimated simultaneously. For ease of reference,
model 1 reports the results of the last row of table 4. For
brevity, we do not discuss the coefficients of the covariates
xk which are of only secondary importance.10
C. The Effects of Becoming Unemployed
The estimated effects of unemployment spells on return
migration hazards are reported in table 5. Across all three
specifications and all immigrant groups, it is evident that
unemployment spells shorten migration durations.11
10 The estimates are available from the authors. The covariates include
extensive measures of demographics, a nonparametric function of income,
housing descriptors, sector dummies, cohort effects measured by the year
of entry, and controls for macro effects.
11 In the discussion paper version of this paper (Bijwaard et al., 2012),
we quantify the impacts of the unemployment process in various evalu-
ation exercises in terms of the return probability 1 − Pr{Tm > t} where
We recall that the average effect γu for all of the groups of
immigrants estimated in model except for immigrants from
non-EU DCs, the significant point estimates ranging from
0.68 to 1.2. Models 2 and 3 reveal that the effect exhibits
duration dependence. In model 2, for EU migrants, the impact
peaks for durations of 3 to 6 months. For non-EU migrants,
the picture is more heterogeneous, as duration dependence
increases for immigrants from LDCs, whereas the coeffi-
cients remain insignificant for the others except for long
durations. In model 3, we further permit the effect to vary
across characteristics (demographics and labor market his-
tory). This increases the magnitude of the duration effects
for EU immigrants, and follows since the duration of the pre-
ceding employment spell lengthens the migration spell. By
Pr{Tm > t} = Evm {exp(−
∫ t
0 θm(s)ds)}. For instance, consider a reference
individual (βmx = 0, φu = 0, φe = 0) from the EU15 who starts a period of
unemployment three months after entry into the Netherlands in 2003. If he
is unemployed for twelve rather than three months, the maximal increase
in the return probability is 6 percentage points. If he is from an LDC, the
maximal difference is 14 percentage points. Holding the length of the unem-
ployment period constant at six months, but starting it progressively later,
we found a maximal increase in return probabilities of 6 percentage points.
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Table 7.—Sensitivity Analysis: Migration Durations Less Than Three years
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs
Estimated Effect of Unemployment on Return Migration Hazards
Constant effect [γu] 0.574∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.324 1.234∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.213) (0.280) (0.378)
Duration dependence [αu]
0–3 months 0.700∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.078 1.180∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 1.837∗∗∗ −0.160 1.015∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.218) (0.257) (0.373) (0.135) (0.326) (0.282) (0.394)
3–6 months 0.818∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.007 1.223∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗ −0.215 1.014∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.223) (0.259) (0.377) (0.138) (0.329) (0.284) (0.396)
6–12 months 0.721∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ −0.561∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 1.805∗∗∗ −0.758∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗
(0.127) (0.227) (0.264) (0.381) (0.140) (0.335) (0.290) (0.398)
More than 1 year 0.826∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ −0.781∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 1.713∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗ 0.632
(0.139) (0.246) (0.268) (0.395) (0.149) (0.354) (0.300) (0.406)
Estimated Effect of Reemployment on Return Migration Hazards
Constant effect [γe] −0.008 0.341∗∗∗ 0.310 −0.071
(0.051) (0.080) (0.176) (0.100)
Duration dependence [αe]
0–3 months −0.163∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.188 −0.101 −0.025 0.576∗∗∗ −0.079 −0.027
(0.076) (0.122) (0.227) (0.166) (0.103) (0.223) (0.321) (0.239)
3–6 months 0.091 0.560∗∗∗ 0.309 0.116 0.244∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ −0.003 0.259
(0.074) (0.131) (0.246) (0.170) (0.103) (0.227) (0.330) (0.242)
6–12 months 0.039 0.219 0.460∗∗ −0.149 0.209∗∗ −0.474∗∗ 0.082 0.048
(0.065) (0.140) (0.215) (0.166) (0.098) (0.235) (0.308) (0.240)
More than 1 year −0.339∗∗∗ 0.211 0.288 −0.270 −0.151 0.488 −0.105∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.072) (0.182) (0.268) (0.173) (0.106) (0.262) (0.330) (0.252)
See the notes to table 5.
contrast, the effect of the previous labor market history is
found to be insignificant for non-EU DC immigrants.
D. Effects of Becoming Reemployed
Finding employment after a period of unemployment is a
positive labor market event that is likely to have an impact
on migration duration. Table 6 reports the results. For all
except non-EU LDC immigrants, the effect of having found
employment after being unemployed delays the migrant’s
return. The effect is particularly strong for immigrants from
developed countries outside the EU. Previous unemployment
durations exhibit an effect only if these were no longer than
three months, indicating that such periods of unemployment
were anomalies that the individual quickly overcame. The one
immigrant group that deviates from this pattern of extended
migration durations is made up of immigrants from the new
EU—mainly Polish immigrants. The estimated impact of
reemployment for this group, however, is consistent with tar-
get savings: having regained employment, it is plausible that
such immigrants are back on track to reach their savings target
and return once they have saved enough.
E. Sensitivity Checks
Our modeling approach assumes that unobserved hetero-
geneity v is time invariant. One concern is that this might not
be valid for individuals who experience multiple labor market
transitions. However, we cannot condition on the experience
of only one period of unemployment because of the ensuing
selection bias. We address this concern by truncating the data
at 36 months since entry, a period sufficiently long to allow
labor market events to take place while at the same time being
sufficiently short to make multiple transitions less likely.
The left panel of figure 4 depicts the estimates of the
Kaplan Meier estimates of unemployment probabilities and
the imposed cut-off date. The plot illustrates, as did our earlier
descriptive tables, the substantial unemployment risk that all
immigrant groups experience and the importance of stratifica-
tion by immigrant group. Table 7 reports, for these restricted
data, the estimates of models 1 to 3, concentrating for reasons
of space on the estimates of the impact coefficients γk and
αk .
The results for the restricted durations are similar to those
for the unrestricted sample of tables 5 and 6. The coefficients
have changed only slightly without affecting the qualitative
conclusions. The right panel of figure 4 illustrates the effect of
the change in the coefficients brought about by the truncation
at month 36. These are assessed in terms of the effect on return
probabilities for the representative immigrant, assuming an
unemployment period of twelve months that starts in month
3 (see also note 11). For EU15 immigrants, there is a small
effect on return probabilities for the higher durations, whereas
for LDC immigrants, there is no discernable difference.
Another concern could be our selection rule that the immi-
grant be employed within three months of entry into the
Netherlands, imposed to limit the potential of misclassifica-
tion of the labor motive. We have reestimated the models for
varying cut-offs. For brevity, table 8 reports the estimates of
the impacts of the labor market process on migration hazards
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Table 8.—Effect of Changing the Initial Employment
Requirement in Model 1
Non-EU
EU 15 New EU DCs LDCs
Unemployment
2 months 0.759∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.171 1.232∗∗∗
3 months 0.778∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.223 1.207∗∗∗
4 months 0.767∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.213 1.241∗∗∗
5 months 0.739∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.280 1.248∗∗∗
Reemployment
2 months −0.078∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.080
3 months −0.091∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.093
4 months −0.099∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.120
5 months −0.105∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ −0.095
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
of model 1 (the same conclusions obtain for models 2 and 3).
We observe only a small change in the point estimates, and
all qualitative conclusions remain unchanged.
Online appendix B contains several other simulation-based
robustness checks: we verify the robustness of our estimation
procedure, conduct a simulation-based placebo test assuming
no labor market impact, and examine the sensitivity of the
results to departures from the no-anticipation assumption.
V. Conclusion
The majority of recent labor immigration to the Nether-
lands is temporary rather than permanent. Across all immi-
grant groups, a substantial proportion leave the host country
eventually, and many do so within 24 months. We have con-
sidered in this paper the individual labor market drivers of
immigration durations.
Despite this extent of temporary immigration, the interde-
pendence of labor market events and immigration durations
has received little attention in the empirical literature. We
have addressed this gap using a unique Dutch administrative
panel of the entire population of recent labor immigrants,
in which we observe entry, exit, reason for migration, and
complete labor market histories. The large size of the data
permitted us to stratify the analysis by distinct immigrant
groups. The timing-of-events method enabled us to esti-
mate the effects of employment and unemployment histories
on migration durations, while we controlled for unobserv-
able heterogeneity. Simpler models that ignore such error
correlations across labor market and migration processes
were shown to exhibit substantial selection biases.
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